The global fertility rate has seen a dramatic fall. Peaking at 5.3 births per woman in 1963, it has consistently declined for six decades, now standing at approximately 2.2 births per woman. This figure is barely above the replacement rate of 2.1 babies needed to maintain current population levels, a threshold many countries have fallen below.
Numerous explanations exist for this global trend, often colored by personal or political viewpoints. Common arguments include the escalating expense of raising children, women’s career commitments, and insufficient childcare support.
With birth rates in countries like the UK, Australia, and the US hovering between 1.4 and 1.6, and reaching as low as 1.2 in Japan and 0.75 in South Korea, the prevailing understanding of declining fertility has largely been shaped by demographers. Their focus on macro-level, population-wide data and future projections, however, overlooks critical individual-level nuances.
Paula Sheppard, a cognitive and evolutionary anthropologist at the University of Oxford, argues that this population-centric view misses the finer details: the specific societal groups experiencing lower birth rates and the diverse motivations behind these choices.
Sheppard’s research adopts a more individual-focused approach, aiming to uncover the genuine reasons behind delayed family planning and the decision to have fewer children. Her work explores how aspects of modern life, from urban isolation to contemporary office environments, clash with our species’ evolutionary patterns for child-rearing. She discusses how her ongoing research reveals the single most influential factor individuals consider when deciding on family size.
The Panic and the Projections
Penny Sarchet notes the current climate of concern surrounding birth rates.
Paula Sheppard clarifies a common misconception: “People think they’ve never been this low before, but they’re actually not [a record low].” She recalls the post-World War II era, when low birth rates also triggered panic among demographers, politicians, and policymakers. Their attempts to forecast population trends proved inaccurate, failing to predict the subsequent baby boom.
Predicting future trends remains challenging. While rates are currently below replacement level in many regions, particularly in South Korea and Japan, European and North American countries are also not exceeding the replacement rate.
Justified Alarm?
“I don’t think so,” Sheppard states regarding the widespread alarm. “There are [nearly] 9 billion people on the planet. We’re not going to go extinct any time soon.” She acknowledges the opposing viewpoint, which highlights global overpopulation, poverty, and inequality, sentiments particularly prevalent among younger generations.
“But I understand why certain media outlets like to push panic, and certain politicians have their own agendas,” she adds. “I don’t think we should panic, but at the same time, I think if people want to have two or three kids, they should be able to have two or three kids – but often they aren’t.”
What Traditional Studies Miss
“One issue is the difference between thinking about things at a population level and thinking about things among individuals on the ground,” Sheppard explains. She finds macro-level analysis to be “not super helpful.” A country’s aggregate fertility rate, she argues, obscures the varied behaviors of different societal segments, noting that both poorer and very wealthy individuals tend to have more children, indicating a complexity beyond national statistics.
An Individual-Centric Research Approach
Sheppard describes her unique, individual-level methodology implemented in the UK, with plans for international expansion. This mixed-methods project involved focus groups, including men who are often excluded from such discussions. The qualitative data generated a shortlist of key considerations for prospective parents.
Following this, she applied a discrete choice experiment, a method rarely used in fertility research, typically found in health economics and transport science. This innovative approach allowed her to investigate the factors influencing people’s decisions about family size and explore what support mechanisms might enable them to have the number of children they desire.
Capturing Nuance Through Experimentation
The online nature of the discrete choice experiment enabled a large, nationally representative participant pool. Although the majority of participants were heterosexual, the methodology allowed for the ranking of identified factors. This enabled analysis of trade-offs, such as how much longer individuals would be willing to wait to start a family to secure a hands-on partner or a suitable home.
Findings on Diverse Preferences
The study revealed distinct priorities across different demographic groups, with notable differences based on educational attainment, although some congruence existed between men and women.
Individuals without a university degree showed a strong interest in housing but less so in mortgages. Men in this group emphasized neighborhood quality, expressing reluctance to have more children without access to better amenities like green spaces and improved schools. Women focused on practical needs, such as adequate space for children and a garden, without prioritizing mortgage debt.
Sheppard suggests this highlights the need for multifaceted policies. For example, tax incentives for home buying primarily benefit those seeking homeownership, while others may prefer renting and avoid such debt, despite current rental market difficulties.
Educational Attainment and Parental Roles
For women with degrees, the desire for co-parenting was prominent, with an emphasis on fathers actively participating in childcare. This contrasted with women without degrees, who focused more on committed relationships. The prospect of single motherhood was identified as the most undesirable outcome in the experiment. Higher-educated women specifically sought involved fathers, a distinct form of support compared to their less-educated counterparts.
Sheppard clarifies that her work indicates women are having fewer children than they would like. “Absolutely,” she confirms. While acknowledging that some individuals do not wish to have children, she states that in the UK, for every three desired births, only two occur.
Highly educated women, she observes, are inclined to postpone childbearing until they are confident of a father’s substantial co-parenting commitment. This stems from the significant career penalties women face beyond standard maternity leave. These women prioritize waiting until they are well-established in their careers before starting a family, a factor directly linking higher education levels with delayed childbearing.
Among higher-educated men, the sentiment is “When she’s ready, I’m ready,” but these women are waiting for a partner willing to actively share parenting duties.
Male Priorities and Parental Leave
University-educated men prioritized factors like job flexibility, including the ability to take leave and work remotely when necessary. This readiness to adapt reflects a desire for hands-on parenting. Sheppard emphasizes the importance of enhanced parental leave for men, noting its benefits for children, father-child relationships, and women.
The Disappearing “Village”
“It famously takes a village to raise a child and, due to urbanisation, more people than ever don’t have that village,” the text notes, framing a core issue. Social support emerged as the most significant factor in Sheppard’s study.
The capacity for female humans to manage multiple dependent children simultaneously is a defining characteristic of our species, unlike in chimpanzees, which reproduce at much longer intervals. Human cooperative breeding, supported by fathers, grandparents, and extended social networks, is fundamental to our evolutionary success.
Across all study groups, participants consistently desired support from partners or parents. Higher-educated women also sought the camaraderie of friends and participation in peer groups, such as mothers’ groups, indicating a need for social connection and shared experiences.
The Role of Financial Strain
While the high cost of living, particularly housing and childcare expenses, is frequently cited as a reason for reduced fertility, Sheppard found it was less influential than other factors like partner support or broader social networks. This is logical, as a strong support system can significantly lessen childcare costs; for example, grandparental assistance can translate into substantial savings.
Delayed Childbearing and Anthropological Norms
Sheppard notes that higher-educated women perceive childbearing in their 30s as typical, a relatively late age from an anthropological perspective. This delay, she suggests, stems from families’ difficulty in achieving other life goals before starting or expanding their family.
Improving the compatibility between work and parenting, she believes, could encourage individuals to start families at younger ages.
The Generational Gap: Want vs. Get
“Yes – a lot of the gap between the number of children you want and the number of children you get is driven by delay,” Sheppard confirms. This pattern extends beyond highly educated women, with others also delaying childbearing into their late twenties.
Global Fertility Trends
The declining fertility trend is not confined to Europe. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the only region with very high fertility rates, although these are also expected to decrease over time.
However, differing dynamics are at play globally. For instance, in Bangladesh, fertility rates are around 2 children per family. While women typically marry young (around 18) and have their first child at 19 and a second at 22, they cease childbearing thereafter. This reduction in family size is not driven by the same delays observed in the UK.
Policy and the Challenge of Reversing Trends
The question of whether policies can effectively boost birth rates is complex. France, with a fertility rate of approximately 1.7 in its western and northern European context, attributes its higher rate to policies like heavily subsidized childcare and incentives. However, even in Nordic countries, which are leaders in gender-equality parenting policies, significant increases in fertility have not materialized. These countries also report low fertility rates.
“Policies can have short-term changes, maybe, but they can’t make everyone start having four kids,” Sheppard states. “There’s no silver bullet.”
A Core Message on Parenting and Work
Amid the considerable public and political discourse on birth rates, Sheppard emphasizes one crucial takeaway: “It is about making parenting and working compatible, whatever that means for different people, and stopping pitting them against each other.” She recalls a time when work and parenting were more inherently compatible, with women traditionally working and raising children simultaneously. The current societal structure, she argues, separates the professional sphere from family life, suggesting a need for cultural transformation to reintegrate these aspects.