Europe was aware of the potential for escalating conflict. For weeks, leaders and policymakers observed the United States military buildup in the Middle East. They also noted the Trump administration’s clear threats to Tehran, demanding the cessation of all nuclear aspirations under penalty of further action.
However, since the commencement of the US-Israeli offensive against Iran three days prior, the continent has appeared uncoordinated, if not fractured. It seems decidedly lacking in leverage, seemingly caught in the crosscurrents of unfolding events.
Each European nation, quite understandably, is focused on the safety of its citizens within the region. This includes assessing the necessity and feasibility of evacuating potentially tens of thousands of individuals.
European governments also express concern regarding the repercussions the burgeoning Middle Eastern crisis might have on domestic consumers. Price increases for energy and food are significant worries. Indeed, European gas prices have surged to levels not witnessed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022.
Politically, Europe is demonstrably finding it difficult to present a united front amidst the rapid and disorienting developments in the Middle East.
The continent’s major powers—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—did manage to issue a joint statement over the weekend. In it, they cautioned Iran, indicating readiness to undertake “defensive action” to dismantle its missile and drone capabilities unless Tehran ceased its “indiscriminate attacks.”
Following this, the UK agreed to a US request to utilize two British military bases for “defensive” strikes targeting Iranian missile installations. President Trump, however, has expressed criticism regarding the UK’s comparatively limited involvement.
France is strengthening its military presence in the Middle East following an Iranian strike that impacted a French base in the United Arab Emirates. Germany has stated its soldiers remain prepared for “defensive measures” if attacked, but indicated no further plans beyond that were in motion.
Crucially, all three countries refrained from questioning the legality of the US-Israeli strikes under international law. Scrutiny of Washington’s actions was also conspicuously absent from the numerous social media posts by the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas.
Balancing Alliances and International Law
A primary consideration for these European leaders is the avoidance of alienating Donald Trump. They harbor a strong hope that the Middle Eastern events will not become another distraction for the US president, thereby preventing him from engaging in the pursuit of a sustainable resolution to another ongoing conflict: the war in Ukraine.
However, does the reticence of certain prominent European powers regarding the legality of recent US actions, in places like Iran or Venezuela, potentially obscure critical issues? These nations often emphasize Europe’s shared values and its commitment to a rule-based international order. Yet, questions arise about the precise interpretation and application of these rules.
Spain’s prime minister has made his position clear. Pedro Sanchez took to social media, proclaiming, “one can be against a hateful regime, as is the case with the Iranian regime… and at the same time be against an unjustified, dangerous military intervention outside of international law.”
Several US aircraft departed from Spain on Monday after Madrid indicated that its bases could not be utilized for attacks against Iran.
Meanwhile, the European Union has presented a picture of complete disarray. A statement from the member states’ foreign ministers stopped short of endorsing regime change in Iran. In contrast, the president of the European Commission, the EU’s principal executive body, explicitly advocated for it on Sunday. “A credible transition in Iran is urgently needed,” stated Ursula von der Leyen in a social media post.
This situation hardly demonstrated a unified approach.
Yet, the declared ambition of European nations, both within and outside the EU, including the UK, in this new and volatile geopolitical landscape characterized by Great Power competition, is to enhance their collaborative efforts in areas of mutual interest, particularly in security and defense.
The fundamental question remains: are they genuinely capable of achieving this objective?
A Shifting Nuclear Landscape
The year 2026 has indeed been marked by significant global upheaval, with crises in Venezuela, Greenland, and Iran. Europe currently faces an expansionist Russia on its borders, an economically assertive China, and an increasingly unpredictable ally in Washington.
On Monday, President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would be revising its nuclear doctrine and increasing its stockpile of nuclear warheads. He cited the evolving capabilities of “competitors” and “partners” as the reason for this strategic adjustment.
Russia possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and China is rapidly expanding its capabilities. While the United States, the second-largest global nuclear power, has provided a nuclear deterrent for Europe for decades, shifts in Washington’s priorities have instilled a sense of unease among European nations.
Sweden, Germany, and Poland have directly approached France to request broader European nuclear coverage, supplementing the protection already afforded to NATO allies by the United Kingdom, the only other European nuclear power.
President Macron finds himself in a position where his long-standing advocacy for greater European strategic autonomy in defense is being highlighted. This includes a significant push into space capabilities, utilizing dual-use satellites through the European Space Agency, of which the UK is also a member.
However, achieving effective coordination remains a substantial challenge. Weapons procurement serves as a stark illustration of this difficulty. While the United States utilizes approximately 30 distinct weapon systems, Europe employs a frequently duplicated 178. “Inefficient, expensive and slow,” was the critical assessment provided last week by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola.
NATO is attempting to address this through efforts to manage acquisition decisions across its 32 member states. The core issue, however, is that the defense alliance’s guidelines are merely voluntary. All NATO members, with the exception of Spain, succumbed to pressure from Donald Trump last year and agreed to increase their defense spending. Equally significant, however, is the question of whether this expenditure is being utilized effectively.
The prevailing inclination among most national governments is to safeguard their own defense industries, even if it comes at the detriment of neighboring countries. France is frequently accused of this practice.
Historical Context Shapes Priorities
As the unfolding events in the Middle East starkly illustrate, each country on the continent possesses its own distinct priorities, strengths, and weaknesses, shaped by its historical experiences and the concerns of its electorate.
The fact that Germany felt compelled to state unequivocally this week that it does not intend to increase its military presence in the Middle East, let alone participate in any offensive actions, stems directly from a pervasive post-conflict hesitancy within Germany, largely rooted in the nation’s past.
Recall Germany’s initial international ridicule and criticism for its delayed provision of tanks to Ukraine following Russia’s full-scale invasion four years ago. Then-German Chancellor Olaf Scholz did not appear displeased with the nickname “Friedenskanzler” (Peace Chancellor) bestowed upon him by the German press. A significant segment of German society was initially deeply uncomfortable with the prospect of German armaments being deployed against Russians once more, as they had been during the two world wars of the previous century.
While still acknowledging national sensitivities, the current German government, led by Friedrich Merz, is charting a markedly different course. It now stands as the single largest donor of military aid to Ukraine.
Like the rest of Europe, Germany relied on the United States for its security for decades. However, with the Trump administration insisting that Europe assume a greater share of its own defense responsibilities, Germany plans to increase its defense budget by 2029. According to NATO projections, this expenditure will surpass the combined budgets of France and the UK.
Germany also aims to establish the largest conventional army in Europe. Eighty years after the end of World War Two, and with Germany firmly integrated into NATO and the EU, fellow European powers are welcoming this German military initiative rather than perceiving it as a threat.
Italy’s prime minister, by contrast, is navigating an exceedingly challenging path, balancing Italian public opinion with what she believes are her country’s and her own best interests on the global stage. Thus far, Giorgia Meloni has maintained a very low profile regarding the US-Israeli attacks on Iran. She is one of the few European leaders with a notably warm relationship with Donald Trump.
As the third-largest economy in mainland Europe, one might expect Italy to play a prominent role in continental security. However, until recently, it ranked among the lowest defense spenders in Europe. An understanding of Italian history is necessary to comprehend this situation.
Italy was only unified in 1861. Prior to that, it was considered a “battleground of Europe,” with foreign powers repeatedly exploiting its territories. Consequently, Italians developed a reliance on, and trust in, very few external entities rather than “the state” for their protection.
Italy stood out in Western Europe when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It was the only country where, from the outset, a majority of the population opposed sending weapons to support Kyiv.
Italians expressed sympathy for Ukrainians but many questioned Italy’s involvement in the conflict. They simply lacked confidence in their government’s ability to protect them from the consequences, such as rising energy prices or potential Russian reprisals.
Four years on, only 15% of Italians believe the EU and US should continue to arm Ukraine until Russian forces are expelled, according to the Institute for the Study of International Politics.
This situation places Italy’s staunchly pro-Ukraine prime minister in a highly precarious position. Her significant defense pledges to international allies are at odds with the sentiments of the majority of Italian voters. Most Italians also oppose Giorgia Meloni’s commitment to her counterpart in the White House to substantially increase defense spending.
Ad-Hoc Coalitions Emerge
An awareness of allies’ national sensitivities, and consequently, their reliability in certain situations, is paramount as Europe embarks on a self-declared era of closer cooperation.
The difficulties inherent in acting “as one,” as witnessed again with the Middle East crisis, are leading to the formation of smaller, ad-hoc coalitions of countries. These alliances form for mutual convenience around specific issues, such as joint defense procurement projects, like the recent UK-Norway Defence Pact aimed at tracking Russian submarines in the North Atlantic, or the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine, spearheaded by the UK and France.
Increasingly, these “European” or Western alliances include like-minded nations from outside the continent, such as Canada, South Korea, and Japan, which are also frequently integrated into NATO military exercises.
Feeling pressure in the current global climate where power dynamics are central, the community of nations involved in European cooperation is expanding. However, this also heightens the challenge of understanding the motivations of each member and assessing their capacity for effective collaboration.